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Abstract
Helping clients gain insight into the ways in which their thinking influences the 
expression of emotional distress and maladaptive behavior is an important goal of 
CBT-based psychotherapies. However, efforts to establish this insight into the con-
nection between dysfunctional beliefs and the consequences of having them (i.e., 
B–C connection) are often met with resistance. To address this issue in practice, 
therapists can draw upon certain existential principles underpinning CBT theory. 
More specifically, practitioners can use the concepts of existential freedom and 
responsibility, contained in the rational-humanistic view of rational-emotive behav-
ior therapy, to complement current disputation strategies in the object to establish 
the B–C connection and, importantly, to facilitate cognitive change. Employing in 
practice what is postulated in theory in such cases is apt to provide individuals with 
a larger context of human agency in which to consider cognitive mediation.
Keywords Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) · B–C connection · Existentialism · 
Humanism · Rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT) · Strategies · Cognitive 
change
What are the conditions of cognitive change in cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)? 
From the outset it is clear that there are probably a number of factors involved in 
treating dysfunctional cognitive processes; there is likely not a single, necessary 
condition. The relative criticality of these factors, or mechanisms, to the process of 
psychotherapeutic change largely depends on the form of CBT under consideration. 
Different schools of CBT postulate different mechanisms of change (Austad 2009; 
David et al. 2010; Kuehlwein and Rosen 1993) and differ by their object to modify 
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the function or content of these mechanisms (Herbert and Cardaciotto 2005). The 
question posed above might, therefore, seem relative to the form of CBT under con-
sideration, but there are some ideas regarding cognitive change to which almost all 
CBT-based treatments accord. Namely, there is a rudimentary emphasis in general 
CBT theory not only on the idea that certain types of cognition, such as appraisals 
and schemas, influence the expression of emotional distress and maladaptive behav-
ior, but also on having individuals discern that their beliefs, emotions, and behaviors 
all relate in basic and complex ways (Beck 1976, 1995; Clark 1995; David et  al. 
2010; Ellis 1962, 1994). Importantly, it is this latter emphasis that, when realized in 
practice, facilitates a marked opportunity to achieve cognitive change.
In clinical practice, cultivating this insight in clients has been referred to as estab-
lishing the B–C connection (Dryden 2006). The idea behind establishing the B–C 
connection in clients and why it is important to progress in CBT is that dysfunctional 
cognitive processes are rendered especially susceptible to modification, or cognitive 
restructuring (see Clark 2014), when individuals are aware of the interrelationships 
between their thinking, feeling, and behaving: that is, when they have a strong B–C 
connection and are able to actively identify their beliefs about goal-incongruent events 
(David et al. 2010). However, establishing the B–C connection in practice can often 
be problematic. To help individuals acknowledge more responsibility for their states of 
functioning, therapists are frequently tasked with having to inculcate, and re-inculcate, 
individuals with the B–C connection (Ellis 2002; Ellis and Dryden 2007). For instance, 
clients typically agree—after some resistance—with the general idea that people have 
influence over their response selection in goal-relevant situations, and they can under-
stand this principle in relation to their evaluations about recent life-episodes that have 
been under consideration with the therapist; however, seldom do they succeed in apply-
ing this understanding to future, novel events: A goal-incongruent situation occurs in 
the future, as they invariably will, and the client misattributes his emotional distress to 
factors relating to that event, such as to the actions of others.
Frequent recapitulation of the B–C connection suggests that it is sometimes not 
being sufficiently established, which could ultimately impact the degree to which cli-
ents achieve cognitive change. Employing psychotherapeutic strategies that improve 
the strength and speed at which the B–C connection is instilled might address this 
issue. The present paper considers the possibility that, strategically, it is key for prac-
titioners to draw upon the humanistic-existential principles underpinning CBT theory. 
More specifically, appealing to the principles of human freedom and responsibility 
might help build a more robust, conceptual foundation on which to cultivate the B–C 
connection in clinical practice. That is, it provides a broader context of human nature in 
which individuals can discern their role in generating emotional distress. Consequently, 
this strategy might facilitate cognitive change across a range of CBT-based schools of 
psychotherapy.
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The Rational‑Humanistic View
Although there are a number of CBT-based therapies that have long appreciated 
aspects of existentialism, rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT) is an exem-
plar of one which explicitly acknowledges the existential-humanistic underpin-
nings of its general theory (see Ellis 1994); thus, it is an excellent CBT theory 
upon whose tenets practitioners can draw to better help clients understand and 
accept the principle of cognitive mediation (i.e., B–C connection). In brief, REBT 
is the first, classical form of CBT (Ellis 1958). In addition, REBT has long been 
shown to be an efficacious form of psychotherapy (e.g., Engels et al. 1993; Lyons 
and Woods 1991; Smith and Glass 1977; Wampold et al. 1977). At the core of its 
theory is the postulation of a cognitive-vulnerability model (on which many other 
forms of CBT are also predicated) according to which certain cognitive processes 
are etiopathogenic (David et  al. 2010). More specifically, dysfunctional cogni-
tive processes interact with stressful environmental, or psychological, events to 
generate unhealthy emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses (David and 
Szentagotai 2006). However, unique to REBT is the idea that the pathogenesis of 
psychopathological symptoms is largely the product of irrational belief processes, 
which are a type cognitive appraisal (David et al. 2002; see Scherer et al. 2001). 
Irrational beliefs are a valuation of the impact of events on one’s goals and per-
sonal well-being, but are distinct from other types of appraisal processes because 
their content is inherently illogical, unempirical, and non-pragmatic, which con-
sequently facilitates dysfunction such as emotion dysregulation (see David et al. 
2010 for a contemporary account of irrational belief processes).
Importantly, REBT holds that people are ultimately responsible for whether 
these dysfunctional cognitive processes are maintained or rejected in every-
day life. The grounds for this proposition can be traced to the existential roots 
of REBT theory: to what Ellis (1994) referred to as the rational-humanistic 
view. The foundations of REBT theory include not only a position on life and 
the world that emphasizes logical consistency and empirical facts in the pur-
suit of cultivating rational beliefs but also a position on the liberty and, indeed, 
prerogative of human beings to choose the precepts by which they guide their 
behavior and to decide the meaning(s) of their lives; it is an amalgamation of 
both reason and meaning. Ellis (1994) described a list of ten existential concepts 
to which REBT theory is markedly sympathetic, and perhaps the most critical 
of these concepts are of human freedom and responsibility. According to these 
ideas, human beings exist prior to any concept by which they can define them-
selves; they have no natural teleology—i.e., purpose (Sartre 1943). A well-known 
example in the existential literature is that the function of scissors is to cut, but 
unlike scissors, the essence of human beings is not predetermined. Instead, peo-
ple are free to transcend their basic existence—the nothingness from which this 
existence came—and to create or appropriate the meaning(s) of their lives (Sartre 
1943, 1957, 1987). The corollary of this basic freedom is that people have the 
autonomy to adopt or renounce the many meanings and perspectives of the world 
in which they find themselves living. In short, there are no objective grounds for 
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determining the value or significance of one’s life; rather, life is a creative pro-
ject undertaken on the part of the individual (Frankl 1946, 1986; Nietzsche 1995, 
2011); for a more comprehensive discussion on existentialism, see Guignon and 
Pereboom (2001).
REBT theory has also long propounded that innate fallibility is an important fea-
ture of human nature in addition to existential freedom (Ellis 1962). Human fallibil-
ity involves the propensity to sometimes fail at important tasks as well as encom-
passes the inclination to uncritically adopt tenuous ideas early in life, especially the 
ones with which people are rigorously indoctrinated. Although individuals are not 
responsible for this sense of fallibility, their existential liberties render them respon-
sible for whether they critically challenge or continue to credulously accept errone-
ous ideas once subscribed to them. Not reflecting, in a Cartesian sense, upon the 
veracity of that which one holds as true is itself a choice, as the mind has avail-
able to it the faculties to enact such epistemological reasoning (James 1890/2012). 
Interestingly, thinking about one’s thinking in this way is likely served by metacog-
nitive processes (see Wells and Purdon 1999). What is more is that the ability of 
clients to discern this sense of responsibility and to incorporate this knowledge into 
their thinking about emotions and behavior is markedly important to the process of 
cognitive change in CBT. It would be extremely difficult in everyday life to explic-
itly challenge a dysfunctional cognition if one did not know to look for one after 
experiencing the consequences of having it. Therefore, practitioners make a point 
to assist clients in understanding how their beliefs mediate the relationship between 
goal-relevant events and emotional, behavioral responses: that is, to make the B–C 
connection (Dryden 2006).
Specifically, practitioners aim to establish the B–C connection early in the pro-
cess of disputing irrational beliefs (DIBS; Beal et al. 1996; Ellis and Dryden 2007); 
in CBT more generally, this is early in the process of cognitive reconstruction (see 
Clark 2014). More particularly, REBT practitioners help to identify beliefs about 
stressful environmental events, to distinguish the irrational from rational aspects of 
these beliefs, and to empirically, logically, and pragmatically challenge the irrational 
ones. In consequence to DIBS, individuals renounce their irrational beliefs and form 
rational ones, facilitating emotional and behavioral responding that is more func-
tional (David et al. 2005). Unfortunately, this process is impeded from the outset if 
clients fail to concede to the principle of cognitive mediation. In these situations, 
it becomes requisite to challenge clients’ beliefs about how emotions and behav-
iors are engendered in human beings, and there are a number of strategies by which 
to carry out this type of disputation: empirically, logically, and pragmatically. For 
example, Dryden (2006) explicated that it is frequently useful to appeal to the idea 
that there would be a complete lack of variance in emotional responding across peo-
ple if their evaluations about the world, self, and others held no influence over such 
functioning. This logic is typically helpful in disputing the idea that thinking has no 
role in eliciting emotions, with clients eventually understanding cognitive media-
tion—at least at an intellectual level—and being able to make the B–C connection 
in the context of the irrational belief(s) under consideration in the current therapy 
session. However, there are often failures in the future to employ the B–C connec-
tion to other contexts or novel situations, whereby clients misattribute their mental 
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states entirely to activating events (Sarracino et al. 2017). This suggests that the B–C 
connection could be more strongly established. The process of cognitive change 
is almost certainly expedited if clients can succeed at making the B–C connection 
when goal-incongruent events occur in their everyday lives.
A construct as important as the B–C connection probably requires for its estab-
lishment not only the aforementioned disputation tactics but also existential-human-
istic approaches that dispute resistance through psychoeducation. Researchers have 
recently outlined a number of parallels between CBT and existential-phenomeno-
logical psychotherapy, suggesting that features of the latter might improve the effec-
tiveness of current CBT-based treatment strategies (e.g., Bornstein 2004; Corrie and 
Milton 2000; Hickes and Mirea 2012; Hutchinson and Chapman 2005). While this 
remains to be demonstrated, it might be enough to consider not what existential-
phenomenological therapies might add to CBT, but what the existential principles 
already rooted in CBT theory might add to its clinical practice. Frankly, existential 
principles are seldom the subject of extensive discussion in the practice of CBT; 
they are covered when pertinent, but sometimes are perhaps not due to a lack of eru-
dition on the part of the clinician. It is worth noting that this is an example—albeit 
minor—of a theory-procedure gap (see Reese et al. 2013) Nonetheless, in so far as 
the B–C connection is not to remain transient, at least some basic psychoeducation 
of the human-existential condition will need to be elucidated. More specifically, the 
rational-humanistic view can inform clinical practice in that learning of a larger con-
text of human agency and responsibility in which to view the B–C connection might 
better cultivate it and, consequently, promote the process of cognitive change.
For instance, take a situation in which a client attributes recent emotional distress 
to an activating event, denying any relation between her thoughts about the event 
and the resultant distress. In this case, instilling in the client that there is such a rela-
tion is important before proceeding to dispute the validity of her irrational thoughts, 
as discussed above. Here, the practitioner can draw on the rational-humanistic view 
to dispute the idea that no cognitive mediation occurred. Particularly, it can be care-
fully explicated that, for example, the responsibility one bears for engaging in mala-
daptive behaviors and feeling unhealthy emotions is only a portion of the aggregate 
responsibility held as a human being, on the whole. The idea behind appealing to 
existential aspects of the human condition is that it provides a more encompass-
ing framework in which to contemplate cognitive mediation. It becomes easier 
to acknowledge one’s role in generating emotional distress if one already accepts 
a larger responsibility for adopting, retaining, and rejecting any type of idea (e.g., 
descriptive propositions that are not affective valuations of goal-relevant events) 
and, particularly, for creating the meaning(s) of one’s life.
Helping clients to grasp this scope of understanding can also be useful outside the 
context of a psychotherapy session. Namely, their newly cultivated rational-humanistic 
views behind the B–C connection could improve their ability to phenomenologically 
identify dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., irrational beliefs) in everyday life: for example, 
to know to introspect about their thinking when experiencing emotional distress and, 
then, to determine if their thinking involved irrational belief processes such as demand-
ingness, catastrophizing, frustration intolerance, or global evaluation (see DiGiuseppe 
1996). That is, cultivating the rational-humanistic view in practice might facilitate in 
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the real-world the metacognitive processes that are potentially involved in activating 
the B–C connection prior to employing self-imposed disputation procedures. Future 
research could explore this possibility.
Interestingly, that people can independently make the B–C connection outside psy-
chotherapeutic settings suggests that, like dysfunctional and functional cognitions, the 
B–C connection is a quantifiable cognitive process. While the present paper encour-
ages the psychoeducation of the rational-humanistic view as a means by which to better 
establish the B–C connection, it suggests also that it might be of interest to researchers 
to assess the plausibility of the B–C connection as construct. There is a great deal of 
evidence supporting the interrelationships between dysfunctional cognitive processes 
and the emotional and behavioral consequences of having them (see David et al. 2010), 
but no studies to date have been conducted to investigate an empirical grounding for 
the cognitive operation by which individuals reach a metacognitive understanding of 
these relationships. This is surprising considering the relevance of the B–C connec-
tion to cognitive change in CBT. Operationally defining and empirically corroborat-
ing the B–C connection could potentially be clinically relevant. For example, clinicians 
could periodically monitor changes in the strength of clients’ B–C connections as well 
as examine the influence of this insight on cognitive change outcomes. Future research 
might begin with developing a psychometric-based, self-report measure using factor 
analysis, or the B–C connection could be modeled in a parallel distributed processing, 
connectionist neural network model (see Tryon 2014).
However, there are a few implications worth considering. First, there is a possibil-
ity that clients will initially reject the type of psychoeducation under consideration if 
their worldviews are in marked contrast to humanism. In this case, practitioners can 
employ typical strategies of disputation to target clients’ erroneous views about the 
human condition; perhaps the above mentioned example of scissors might be use-
ful. Second, there is a risk of a theory-procedure gap if practitioners fail to brush up 
on—as it were—the philosophical underpinnings of CBT theory (Reese et al. 2013). 
In this case, the process of cognitive change might become delayed if practitioners 
neglect the option to further psycho-educate clients when there is a strong resistance 
to establishing the B–C connection. Lastly, the present paper has called for further 
inquiry into the B–C connection itself. Reflection upon the relations between one’s 
thoughts and emotional responses is carried out nowhere else than in the minds of 
clients, suggesting that this potentially metacognitive process can be studied as other 
clinically-relevant phenomena are. Improving our understanding of how the mind 
discerns its own mediation in the generation of emotional distress and maladaptive 
behavior might be valuable to achieving a more comprehensive account of the mech-
anisms underpinning the process of cognitive change, and it might also enhance the 
degree to which forms of CBT are evidence-based.
Psychoeducation as a Disputation Strategy
There are conceptual differences between the various forms of CBT, but most accord 
to the idea that helping clients develop insight into the ways in which their thinking 
influences their emotions and behaviors is crucial to the process of deconstructing 
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dysfunctional cognitions and cultivating functional ones (i.e., cognitive reconstruction). 
One reason is that dysfunctional cognitive processes are more susceptible to change 
when individuals acknowledge that their brains mediate the relationship between goal-
incongruent events and emotional and behavioral responding (David et  al. 2010). In 
other words, achieving cognitive change in therapy is a difficult process—for example, 
disputing dysfunctional appraisals likely places great demands on explicit, controlled 
thought (Braunstein et  al. 2017)—and this becomes exceedingly difficult when indi-
viduals do not, from the outset, have a strong B–C connection: when they do not accept 
that appraisal processes are corrigible and, consequently, neglect to identify the pro-
cesses associated with goal-incongruent events and emotional distress. Moreover, in 
clinical practice, there often is resistance to establishing the B–C connection despite 
the best efforts of CBT practitioners (e.g., Ellis 2002; Ellis and Dryden 2007). There 
is a considerable risk of this type of resistance impacting the larger project of cogni-
tive restructuring in therapy. That is, dysfunctional cognitive processes will not be as 
susceptible to change if only a weak B–C connection has been established; a weak 
connection is evidenced by future misattributions of emotional distress to novel, or 
contextually different, activating events. Therefore, there is reason to augment current 
disputation strategies, or verbal intervention techniques, to improve clients’ thinking 
concerning the interrelationships between goal-incongruent events, affective evalua-
tions, and emotional and behavioral responding.
The rational-humanistic view (Ellis 1962) of REBT theory can inform the clini-
cal practice of CBT-based psychotherapies to potentially addresses this issue. More 
specifically, to better cultivate the B–C connection, practitioners might recognize the 
importance of informing the corrigibility of clients’ dysfunctional evaluations about 
the world, self, and others with not only logic, empiricism, and pragmatics but also 
the larger context of the human-existential condition. That is, clinicians can draw on 
the existential underpinnings of CBT to more thoroughly re-inculcate the B–C connec-
tion when typical strategies fail to so instill the principle of cognitive mediation that 
clients are able to consistently identify their evaluations during or after goal-relevant 
situations. More specifically, this involves psycho-educating clients to help them dis-
cern the always present freedom to renounce or adopt a multitude of perspectives and 
values in the world, as well as the responsibility they bear for retaining or rejecting the 
ideas to which they already subscribe, and understand that these existential aspects of 
being a human being means that every person has liberty to create or appropriate the 
meaning(s) of one’s life. This larger context of human agency might render it easier for 
clients in everyday life to understand how their thinking influences their emotions and 
behavior. In particular, they will have in place an inferential schema that because all 
people are free to determine or create what brings meaning to their lives, all people are, 
therefore, responsible for the meanings they ascribe to instances of goal obstruction.
A Hypothetical Case
The context of this hypothetical case is that the B–C connection has previously 
been established in prior sessions, albeit weakly, because in the session under con-
sideration the client clearly misattributes his depressed feelings. Namely, the client 
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recently received a visit from a childhood friend who lives in a different state. This 
friend moved there a few years ago to pursue a better job. In short, the client found 
the visit highly enjoyable, but afterward felt quite down. He keenly recognized that 
the visit reminded him of a similar opportunity he once had to move out of the town 
in which he grew up and to work in an area of industry in which he was more inter-
ested; however, he makes the mistake of thinking that his depreciated feelings are 
due to him not taking that opportunity. Clearly, disputation of his negative, global 
evaluations about himself is requisite, including the demand that he should of chose 
otherwise in the past. But the effects of disputing these irrational belief processes 
will not likely be as large in so far as the client does not have a stronger B–C con-
nection. Here, there is an opportunity to psycho-educate the client to instrumentally 
dispute the idea that his emotional distress is the direct resultant of not pursuing this 
vocational goal.
Therefore, the practitioner focuses on building a rational-humanistic context of 
cognitive mediation before disputing any irrational belief processes. Specifically, 
the practitioner discusses the existential principle of freedom by explaining that all 
people are born into particular historical epochs over which they have entirely no 
control. One begins existing at an arbitrary period in time as simply a being-in-the-
world, and in that world there already exist a multitude of social and cultural val-
ues and perspectives and, moreover, one is constantly free to transcend their basic 
existence—as it were—by adopting the ideas that bring meaning to one’s life. It is 
made clear to the client that, conversely, people are free to renounce these ideas and, 
consequently, they are responsible for whether or not they continue to hold or decide 
to reject the beliefs they might have incredulously acquired. It is worth noting that, 
here, unconditional acceptance becomes relevant to strengthening the B–C connec-
tion, because it is important that clients accept their fallibility in having uncritically 
subscribed to perhaps a great many tenuous ideas in the world. The client accepts 
these concepts and embraces the idea that people are free and responsible for creat-
ing the meaning(s) of their lives. From here it is a small step to tie in the corollary 
that, therefore, people are free and responsible for the meanings they ascribe to the 
events that occur in their lives—that people actively valuate the significance of goal-
relevant events in everyday life. The client now discerns that there is a mediating 
factor in existing in the world: himself, and, more specifically, that he has mediated 
the relationship between his recent emotional distress and his not pursuing a desired 
job. From here the therapist continues as normal in assisting the client to identify, 
and subsequently reject, the dysfunctional appraisal processes he has been maintain-
ing about this goal-incongruent event.
Conclusions
In sum, reinforcing the rational-humanistic view in practice is a potentially effica-
cious strategy by which to cultivate the B–C connection and reduce resistance to 
cognitive change, and it brings clinical practice closer to its theoretical underpin-
nings. Thus, this is not an existential-phenomenological technique whose object is 
to facilitate the B–C connection in CBT; rather, employing the rational-humanistic 
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view in practice is a form of psychoeducation by which clients views about cogni-
tive mediation are disputed. Instead of using logic or counterfactuals, for example, 
to help clients re-discern cognitive mediation, clinicians can offer a larger, contex-
tual foundation on which to establish the B–C connection: the existential-human 
condition. Showing clients that just as they are always free to create and refine the 
meaning of their lives, they are free to appraise and reappraise the meaning of goal-
incongruent events. Therefore, the rational-humanistic view might be important to 
facilitating the process of cognitive change. This approach to cultivating the B–C 
connection stands to promote in clients the ability to identify the role of their think-
ing in emotional distress in the future and, in the long run, help them deal with eve-
ryday situations in which the universe does not conform to the normativity they have 
imposed on it.
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